			RE AND	CEIVED	
1 2 3 4 5	DAVID PHILLIPS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00538 700 S. 4 TH STREET Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 386-6000 FAX 386-6980 Attorney For Creditor Soroyo Fambro	ANKRUPTCY COURT	Aug 2	10 AH '13	
7		RICT, NEVADA			
8					
9	In re:	Case No.: 12-16252-MKN			
10	PAUL D. POWELL,	Chapter 11			
11	Debtor,				
12 13 14 15	SOROYO ANN FAMBRO, Movant, vs. PAUL D. POWELL, debtor, and UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, Trustee				
16 17 18		AUTOMATIC STAY			
19	Movant SOROYA ANN FAMBRO applies to this court for an order granting her relief from				
20	the automatic stay in the following premises:				
21	FACTS IN SUPPO	ORT OF MOTION			
22					
23	On August 27, 2012, the Movant, SOROYA A	ANN FAMBRO, filed a legal malpra	ctice action		
24	against Mr. Powell, the debtor, as well as Powel	l Litigation Group, LLC, a default co	orporation,		
25	and Michael Kristoff, Esq. See Exhibit 1. Mr. P	owell has filed this Chapter 11 proce	eding.		
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However, on reason and belief, there is insurance coverage in this case, and thus, Mr Powell's real exposure is very limited.

Without relief from the automatic stay Movant would suffer significant and unfair prejudice if her district court action cannot be tried. She therefore asks for relief form the stay, in order that

ARGUMENT

As a general rule, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates to stay litigation involving prepetition claims against the debtor. (Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. (1986) 474 U.S. 494,503.) However, the automatic stay can be lifted, so long as an interested party can demonstrate "cause." 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(1). The Ninth Circuit has explained that "[b]ecause there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case by case basis." (MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald) (9th Cir. 1985) 755 F.2d 715,717; see also Egwineke v. Robertson (In re Robertson) (N.D. Ga 2000) 244 B.R. 880, 882; Baldino v. Wilson (In re Wilson) (3d Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 87,90.) The decision whether to grant relief from stay is "within the broad discretion of the bankruptcy court." (Truebro, Inc. V. Plumberex Specialty Prods., Inc.) (C.D. Cal. 2004) 311 B.R. 551,558).) As the Ninth Circuit has confirmed, relief from stay may be granted to allow litigation pending in another forum to proceed to conclusion. (See, e.g., Packerland Packing Co. V. Griffith Beverage Co. (In re Kimble) (9th Cir. 1985) 776 F.d2 802, 807.) Where litigation is pending, courts may weigh twelve nonexclusive factors, known as "Curtis" factors, in deciding whether to grant relief from an automatic stay. In re Plumberex 311 B.R. at 559(quoting In re Curtis (D. Utah 1984) 40 B.R. 795, 799-800).)

Not every factor will be relevant in every case, and a court is not required to give each factor

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equal weight. (Id. at 560.) Typically, only Curtis Factors One, Two, Five, Seven, Ten and sometimes Twelve are relevant to the Court's determination related to an insured party in an injury case.

Complete Resolution. Curtis Factor One asks whether permitting relief from the stay would result in complete resolution of the issues between the parties. (See In re Plumberex 311 B.R. at 559, 562.) Here, this factor obviously weighs in favor of relieving the stay. Indeed, the only issue between movant/plaintiff and debtor/defendant is the underlying malpractice action. If the relief is granted and movant/plaintiff can litigate her personal injury action to conclusion, the relationship between parties will be over and each can move forward with their respective endeavors.

No Connection with Bankruptcy Proceedings. Curtis Factor Two favors relief from the stay where the state court proceedings are not connected or would not interfere, with the bankruptcy proceedings. (See In re Plumberex, 311 B.R. at 559, 561-62.) This factor again favors relief from the stay. Kline will give up seeking personal assets of the defendant and only proceed against the insurance proceeds. This way, the personal injury action is in no way related to the bankruptcy action. Thus, the personal injury action in no way relates to, nor would it in any way interfere with, the bankruptcy proceedings.

Debtor's Insurance Carrier. Curtis Factor Five looks to whether a debtor's insurance carrier has assumed full responsibility for defending the litigation. (See In re Plumberex, 311 B.R. at 559.) The debtor/defendant will not suffer financially at all from defending the malpractice action, and thus this factor also weighs strongly in favor of lifting the stay. (Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines (1936) 299 U.S. 77, 87-88 (bankruptcy

injunction should be lifted to permit wrongful death suit to go forward since claimant's only interest is establishing liability under the existing insurance policy); *Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In re Hotlkamp)* (7th Cir. 1982 669 F.2d 505, 508) (stay lifted to allow civil action to go forward since bankruptcy estate not jeopardized, as insurer assumed full financial responsibility for defending litigation); *Elliot v. Hardison* (E.D. Va. 1982) 25 B.R. 305, 308 ("Where the claim is one covered by insurance or indemnity, continuation of the action should be permitted since hardship to the debtor is likely to be outweighed by hardship to the plaintiff." (quoting 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.07(3) (15th ed.

Interests of Other Creditors Not Prejudiced. Curtis Factor Seven examines whether the state court litigation would prejudice the interests of other creditors or interested parties. (See In re *Plumberex*, 311 B.R. at 559, 562.) In personal injury matters involving insurance, there is clearly no possibility of prejudice to other creditors. The movant/plaintiff in the injury case seeks to recover only from debtor/defendant's insurance carrier, and thus any recovery plaintiff receives in the personal injury action can have no impact on the defendant's assets, and thus no impact on other creditors or similarly interested parties.

Judicial Economy. Curtis Factor Ten asks whether the interests of judicial economy and expeditious resolution of the issues would be served by relief from the stay. (See In re Plumberex, 311 B.R. at 559.) The legal malpractice action has been filed, and the district court has set the matter for a status check on February 27, 2013. See minute order, Exhibit 2. Moreover, requiring a bankruptcy judge to determine discreet legal malpractice claim, which turn on state law, would not promote judicial economy.

Conclusion. For all of the reasons set forth above, the court should grant the motion for

relief from the automatic stay in accordance with the form of order submitted concurrently herewith. Dated this 25th day of February, 2013 this Raph for /s/David Phillips, Esq. DAVID PHILLIPS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00538 700 S. 4TH STREET Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 386-6000 FAX 386-6980 Attorney For Movant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A Copy of this Motion, attached exhibits, and proposed order was electronically served on Zacharias Larson, Esq., attorney for Debtor, on the above date. David Phillips, Esq.

EXHIBIT 1

CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-12-667452-C XXII

_ County, Nevada

Case No.

	(Assigned	by Clerk's Office)			
I. Party Information					
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone): FAM Oro, Soroya Attorney (name/address/phone): DAVID LEE PHILLIPS, ESQ. 700 South Fourth Street, Las Vega: 702-386-6000 - Office 702-386-6		Defendant(s) (name/add Paul Powell, E P.C. 9 dornastic F Attorney (name/address	Iress/phone): Squindividually Powell Litigation Gro ro Corp. Michael Kistof, Esq. Does I-V Ro Viphone): Corp. I-V		
II. Nature of Controversy (Please chapplicable subcategory, if appropriate)	eck applicable bold	category and	Arbitration Requested		
	Civ	il Cases			
Real Property		Τ	orts		
☐ Landlord/Tenant ☐ Unlawful Detainer ☐ Title to Property ☐ Foreclosure ☐ Liens ☐ Quiet Title ☐ Specific Performance ☐ Condemnation/Eminent Domain ☐ Other Real Property ☐ Partition ☐ Planning/Zoning	Negligence – Au Negligence – Me Negligence – Pro	edical/Dental emises Linbility Slip/Fall)	Product Liability Product Liability/Motor Vehicle Other Torts/Product Liability Intentional Misconduct Torts/Defamation (Libel/Slander) Interfere with Contract Rights Employment Torts (Wrongful termination) Other Torts Anti-trust Fraud/Misrepresentation Insurance Legal Tort Unfair Competition		
Probate		Other Civil	il Filing Types		
Summary Administration General Administration Special Administration Set Aside Estates Trust/Conservatorships Individual Trustee Corporate Trustee Other Probate	Insurance Commerci Other Con Collection Employme Guarantee Sale Conta Uniform C	rect i. Construction Carrier al Instrument tracts/Acct/Judgment of Actions ent Contract	Appeal from Lower Court (also check applicable civil case bax) Transfer from Justice Court Justice Court Civil Appeal Civil Writ Other Special Proceeding Other Civil Filing Compromise of Minor's Claim Conversion of Property Damage to Property Employment Security Enforcement of Judgment Foreign Judgment — Civil Other Personal Property Recovery of Property Stockholder Suit Other Civil Matters		
III. Business Court Requested (Pte	ase check applicable co	tegory; for Clark or Wasi	hoe Counties only.)		
☐ NRS Chapters 78-88 ☐ Commodities (NRS 90) ☐ Securities (NRS 90)	☐ Investments (NR	IS 104 Art. 8) Practices (NRS 598)	☐ Enhanced Case Mgmt/Business ☐ Other Business Court Matters		
Date / 3 / 20 Date Nevada AOC - Planning and Analysis Division	_		noitiating pure or representative		

CLER CHECK 152 8

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Electronically Filed 08/27/2012 12:00:08 PM

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CLERK OF THE COURT

COMP DAVID PHILLIPS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00538 700 S. 4TH STREET Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 386-6000 FAX 386-6980 Attorney For Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SOROYA ANN FAMBRO, an individual
Plaintiff,
vs.

PAUL POWELL ESO, individually.

PAUL POWELL ESO, individually.

PAUL POWELL ESO, individually.

PAUL POWELL, ESQ., individually, POWELL LITIGATION GROUP P.C, a Domestic Professional Corporation, MICHAEL KISTOF, ESQ. DOES 1-V, ROE CORPORATIONS 1-V,

Defendants

PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE

COMES NOW, SOROYA ANN FAMBRO, by and through her attorney DAVID PHILLIPS, ESQ, and hereby files her original Complaint for malpractice against PAUL POWELL, ESQ., individually, MICHAEL KRISTOF, ESQ. POWELL LITIGATION GROUP P.C, a Domestic Professional Corporation, DOES 1-V, ROE CORPORATIONS 1-V, Defendants, and would show as follows:

1. Plaintiff is an individual, who, during the relevant time frame, resided in Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada. She is the former client of the defendant(s). The acts that form the basis of this complaint occurred in Clark County, Nevada.

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- 2. At all times relevant, Defendant, PAUL POWELL, ESQ., is an individual who during the relevant time frame did business as POWELL LITIGATION GROUP, along with defendant MICHAEL KRISTOF, ESQ. The acts that form the basis of this complaint occurred in Clark County, Nevada, by virtue of a cause of action in which the defendants, collectively called "POWELL DEFENDANTS," were retained to represent the plaintiff at the post arbitration stages styled SOROYA FAMBRO v. WALMART, case no A-07-535400, wherein POWELL defendants committed legal malpractice, more particularly described below.
- 3. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of defendants named herein as DOES 1 through 5, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names; Plaintiff is informed and believes an thereupon alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings referred to, and caused damages proximately to Plaintiff as herein alleged, and Plaintiff will ask leave of the Court to amend the Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of DOES 1 through 5, inclusive, when the same have been ascertained, and to join such defendants in this action.

UNDERLYING FACTS THAT FORMED THE BASIS OF LITIGATION

4. That on or about December 5, 2008, the plaintiff retained the defendant POWELL group to represent her in seeking relief from an order striking a Request for Trial De Novo that had been granted in December, 2008.

- 5. That in the arbitration, the arbitrator found that the plaintiff and defendant Wal-Mart were equally liable for the catastrophic damages that occurred at a Wal-Mart in Clark County,
- 6. That the striking of the trial de novo was clearly wrong, but the plaintiff was pro se and did not know how to properly raise the grounds for opposing Wal-Mart's motion to strike the trial de novo.
- 7. That the defendants were retained to file a motion to reconsider the court's ruling striking the trial de novo.
- 8. That the order striking the trial de novo was entered on January 13, 2009, which meant that the plaintiff had until February 15, 2009 to appeal, and also meant that the plaintiff had until that date to include in the appeal any motions for reconsideration that were considered and entered prior to that date.
- That the defendants prepared the Motion for Reconsideration, in which court considered the merits of the Motion, but decided that the striking of the trial de novo stood.
- 10. That the events described in paragraph 9 occurred on February 4, 2009, leaving ten days for the order to be entered, in order that the Reconsideration may be part of the appeal.
- 11. That the defendant had a professional duty to timely submit an order denying the relief requested, in order to make it a part of the record.
- 12. That the defendant failed to submit and enter a timely order.
- 13. That as a direct result of the defendant's failure, the appellate court did not have the benefit of the appropriate and controlling case authority on this issue on striking a de novo request.
- 14. That the defendants further failed to advise the plaintiff of that fact that she had until February 15, 2009 to appeal.

15.	That as	a direct resu	lt of the defen	dants' failt	ires, the pla	aintiff was der	nied her right to
	appeal,	and was den	ied her right t	o a full and	fairly dev	eloped record	for purposes of
	appeal.						

- 16. That the plaintiff would have won her appeal, and thus would have thus had a new trial.
- 17. That it was later learned that Wal-Mart had committed improprieties, and material evidence that would have changed the result of the 50-50 liability award would have been received, and the plaintiff would in all probability have recovered damages in excess of \$10,000.00.
- 18. That because the plaintiff did not timely appeal, her ability to seek redress for her injuries was foreclosed.
- 19. That the plaintiff was not advised properly by the defendants, and the defendants did not acknowledge their professional error.
- 20. That the failure of defendants to timely enter an order on the Reconsideration motion was deficient performance and constitutes legal malpractice.
- 21. That the plaintiff was basically on her own to attempt to figure out what to do.
- 22. That after she consulted with counsel in July 2012, she then became aware of her legal malpractice against the defendants for malpractice, therefore her limitations would begin to commence in July 2012.
- 23. That as a result of the legal malpractice committed by the defendants, the plaintiff has been damaged in an amount greater than \$10,000, for which she now sues.
- 24. That the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees, which are both reasonable and necessary, against the defendant SINGER.

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COUNT ONE-MALPRACTICE

- 25. The plaintiff realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set out therein.
- 26. That the failure of the defendants to timely submit an order granting the reconsideration and refusing to reverse its ruling striking the de novo had a material adverse effect on the plaintiff.
- 27. That the failure to properly advise the plaintiff of her appellate rights, likewise, had a material and adverse effect on the plaintiff. That even her prior attorney perfected her appellate rights by filing a trial de novo timely
- 28. That the failure to enter the order described in paragraph 26, and the failure to either appeal or advise the plaintiff of her appeal rights and deadlines was the proximate cause of the dismissal of the complaint and the loss of her right to a brand new trial de novo.
- 29. That as a result of the attorney-client relationship created by the above conduct of the parties, defendants had a duty to represent plaintiff with the reasonable care, skill, and diligence ordinarily possessed and exercised by ordinary attorneys in similar circumstances.
- 30. That the Defendant's conduct described above was a breach of defendant's duty to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence on plaintiff's behalf.
- 31. That by the failures described above, the defendants breached this duty to represent plaintiff with the reasonable care, skill, and diligence ordinarily possessed and exercised by ordinary attorneys in similar circumstances.
- 32. That as a result of the defendants' negligence and legal malpractice, the plaintiffs thus suffered damages of an amount greater than \$10,000, for which he now sues.

33. That plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this complaint with additional causes of action, as discovery commences.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray for the following:

- Damages in excess of \$10,000, as a result of the defendants' professional negligence and otherwise legal malpractice,
- 2. Costs of court,
- 3. Interest, and
- 4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated this 3rd day of August, 2012.

DAVID MILLIPS, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 00538 700 S. 4TH STREET Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 386-6000 FAX 386-6980 Attorney For Plaintiff

EXHIBIT 2

Case 12-16252-mkn Doc 217 Entered 08/05/13 13:20:17 Page 15 of 19 (Page 1 of 1)

A-12-667452-C

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Negligence - Other		COURT MINUTES	January 30, 2013
A-12-667452-C	Soroya Famb	oro, Plaintiff(s)	
	vs.		
	Paul Powell,	ESQ, Defendant(s)	
January 30, 2013	8-30 AM	Status Check	

January 30, 2013

Status Uneck

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Tiffany Lawrence

RECORDER: Norma Ramirez

PARTIES

Rogers, John S

Attorney for Plaintiff

PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Request of Mr. Rogers to continue and motion to extend time to facilitate service on Defts; stated Deft Powell was in bankruptcy. Court provided a procedural overview and advised she was not inclined to grant an extension to serve unless there were exigent circumstances; Court directed counsel to serve the Defts not in bankruptcy and possibly file a motion to lift the stay as it related to Deft Powell. COURT ORDERED, matter SET.

02/27/13 8:30 AM - STATUS CHECK: PROOF OF SERVICE AND MOTION TO LIFT STAY


PRINT DATE: 01/31/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

January 30, 2013

EXHIBIT 3



•		Case 12-16252-mkn Doc 217 Entered 08/05/13 13:20:17 Page 18 of 19 Case 12-16252-mkn Doc 29-3 Entered 06/12/12 09:48:20 Page 2 of 3								
	1	Daimler Trust, having filed its Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay								
	2	on June 12, 2012, ("the Motion").								
	3	The court finds that there were no timely written objections filed to the								
	4	Motion.								
	5	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Daimler Trust's Motion is hereby granted.								
	6	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section								
	7	362(a) as it is applicable to the debtors and the estate is terminated, with respect to the								
	8	following described personal property ("the leased property"):								
	9	2010 Mercedes Benz CL65								
215	10	VIN # WDDEJ7KB1AA024528.								
.C. SUITE 215 , 89146	11	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 2012								
LVD., VADA. -8095	12	Poli & Ball, P.L.C.								
& BALI 30W B S, NE' 2) 380	13									
POLI & B 3311 S. RAINBOV LAS VEGAS, I (702)	14	By James B. Ball (#5212)								
311 S. LAS	15	James E. Shively (#5497)								
က	16	3311 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 215 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146								
	17	Attorneys for Daimler Trust								
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	•	ase 12-16252-mkn		Entered 08/05/13 1		Page 19 of 19			
		Case 12-16252-mkn	Doc 29-3	Entered 06/12/12	09:48:20	Page 3 of 3			
	1	CERTIFICATION re: LOCAL RULE 9021:							
	2	1) Documents l	isted in sub	section (a) above mu	st be subn	nitted to the court with	1		
	3	the following	g certification	on from the submitting	ng counsel	:			
	4	In accordance with Local Rule 9021, counsel submitting this document certifies that the order accurately reflects the court's ruling and that (check one):							
	5	The court	has waived	I the requirement set	forth in L	R 9021(b)(1).			
	6	No party	appeared a	t the hearing or filed	an objecti	on to the motion.			
	7					all counsel who appea			
	8					at the hearing, and e pond, as indicated be			
	9	[list each part respond to the	•		approved,	disapprove or failed	d to		
2	10	I certify that this is a case under Chapter 7 or 13, that I have served a copy of this order with the motion pursuant to LR 9014(g), and that no party has objected to the form or content of the order.							
FOLI & BALL, F.L.C. RAINBOW BLVD., SUITE 215 VEGAS, NEVADA 89146 (702) 380-8095	11								
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